Abstract: Communication costs are frequently cited as an important determinant of trade costs, but without any supporting empirical evidence. We test this relationship by incorporating alternative measures of communication costs in a model of bilateral trade. We find that international variations in communication costs indeed have a significant influence on trade patterns. Furthermore, estimates using disaggregated data reveal that the impact of communication costs on trade in differentiated products is larger than on trade in homogenous products -by as much as one-third. 
Introduction
Economists have long recognized the importance of communication costs in international trade (Harris, 1995) . Discussions of the causes of growth in world trade in the last quarter of the 20 th century frequently cite technological progress in telecommunications and associated declines in communication costs as an important contributor. In particular, it has been argued that the emergence of international production networks has been driven by improved communication links that facilitated the coordination of geographically dispersed production processes (see, for example, Krugman, 1995, and Venables, 2002 ).
Yet we have virtually no empirical insight on how much communication costs matter for trade and how important they are relative to other components of trading costs. Firm-based surveys frequently list the costs and quality of telecommunications as an important factor in trade and investment decisions. For example, Spinanger (2001) reports evidence from a survey of 14 major textiles and clothing producers in Hongkong (with activities throughout Asia and around the world), which identifies the quality of telecom infrastructure as a key factor in decisions on export-oriented foreign direct investment-more important than policies affecting trade and investment, labor costs, and education and training of workers. Limão and Venables (1999) construct an index of infrastructure density-including availability of telecommunications-and find that it is a significant determinant of bilateral trade costs. Similarly, Freund and Weinhold (2000) analyze the effect of Internet diffusion-measured by a country's number of web hostson trade and find an increasing and significant impact from 1997 to 1999. While these studies provide interesting insights regarding the relevance of communication infrastructure, they do not offer evidence on how international communication costs affect export and import patterns.
This study is a first attempt to directly quantify the effect of communication costs on bilateral trade, both in the aggregate and across different product categories. By employing country-tocountry calling prices, the econometric investigation relies on bilateral variations in communication costs between trading partners. This approach is likely to yield superior estimates compared to the ones obtained from country-specific measures of communication infrastructure.
The paper is organized as follows. We first briefly discuss how communication costs might influence trade (Section I). We then introduce communication costs into a gravity-type model that will form the basis of our empirical investigation (Section II). After describing the data used in this study (Section III), we present the structural estimation results and test the validity of our findings with alternative model specifications (Section IV). Some concluding remarks are offered at the end (Section V).
I. Communication costs, trade costs and trade
Recent research suggests that trade costs have a strong influence on the pattern of specialization and trade. The insights of economic geography models depend critically on the size of trade costs (Krugman, 1991) . Trade costs have also been seen as influencing the choice between trade and investment (Markusen and Venables, 2000, Brainard, 1998) . More recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) have argued that the introduction of trade costs helps explain not just the "home market bias" but a variety of puzzles in the field of international macroeconomics.
In view of this growing prominence, it is surprising that there is limited empirical research on the determinants of trade costs. The existing literature identifies a range of barriers that separate nations-distance, time, information, etc.-but then typically focuses only on transport costs. 1 Although communication costs figure prominently in intuitive explanations and casual observations, they have played little role in the formal analysis of trade costs. This paper seeks to examine whether this neglect matters, and whether the inclusion of the magnitude and variation of communication costs across partner countries can add value to existing explanations of the pattern of trade. The explicit inclusion of communication costs could also shed some light on how far proxies for trade costs such as distance represent the cost of moving goods rather than the cost of moving information.
Our study focuses on both aggregate bilateral trade and trade in different categories of products. Rauch (1999) has persuasively argued that the heterogeneity of manufactures along the dimensions of both characteristics and quality limits the scope for prices to convey all the 1 Hummels (1999) has undertaken pioneering work in this area. necessary information. Therefore, there is little scope for international commodity arbitrage either through organized exchanges or "globally scanning" traders. Instead, connections between buyers and sellers are made through a search process. In facilitating this process, Rauch emphasizes the importance of proximity and preexisting ties that result in trading networks rather than markets. We do not doubt that such networks play an important role, but it would seem that the costs and quality of communication links are also an important determinant of the ease with which information is transmitted. Since the information and communication needs are much greater for differentiated goods, trade in these products is likely to be more sensitive to variations in the costs of communication (Harris, 1995) . 2 Communication between the supplier and consumer is, however, also necessary for other reasons, e.g. transmission of product specifications and timing of production processes. In many cases, the consumer and producer often need to interact in order to jointly produce a customized product that has the desired characteristics. The extent of such interaction evidently depends on the nature of the product, and could affect both the fixed and variable costs of trade.
We assume, nevertheless, that communication costs affect trade primarily by influencing variable trade costs between two nations. This assumption allows us to draw on the large literature that links trade costs to trade performance. Specifically, we can develop a simple multi-sector model of "impeded" trade that generates testable hypotheses in a gravity type estimation framework. The gravity equation is widely regarded as a successful device to empirically model international trade and is well-founded in economic theory. 3 In contrast, the 2 Such pre-sale activities as price-negotiations, etc. can also be assumed to affect the fixed costs.
3 Various studies have shown that the gravity equation can be derived from a variety of trade models that can result in countries' perfectly specializing in a particular good. These models include the simple Ricardian and HeckscherOhlin trade theories as well as the newer theories with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition.
literature on search costs and buyer/seller matching does not offer tractable models that easily lend themselves to empirical application.
It is not obvious how fixed costs could be incorporated into the gravity framework. While Freund and Weinhold (2000) argue that the Internet reduces sunk costs of trading, they eventually estimate an equation that is little different from the standard gravity model. Evans (2000) does amend the standard model to incorporate fixed trading costs that differ across producers. The implication is that some producers would not recover the fixed cost of exporting and so not all output is available to be exported. Empirically, this implies using an appropriately scaled down level of aggregate output in the gravity equation. Failure to make this adjustment implies that the variable trade cost term is (dis)credited with the trade impeding impact of fixed trade costs. This finding in fact supports the approach taken here, because our objective is to measure the aggregate impact of telecommunications costs rather than to identify the precise channel through which they act.
II. Introducing communication costs into a gravity type model of bilateral trade
The purpose of this section is to develop an empirical model that will allow us to empirically explore how cross-country variations in communication costs affect bilateral trade. We consider a representative consumer in the importing country j who maximizes the following utility function defined on the production of all countries:
where ijk c is country j's consumption of sector k's good produced by country i, k σ the elasticity of substitution between any pair of countries' products in sector k, and ik β is a weight parameter.
Preferences are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas over sectors and CES within sectors, whereby jk ρ is country j's (constant) share of expenditure devoted to sector k. Consumers in j derive their See, for example, Anderson (1979) , Helpman and Krugman (1985) , Bergstrand (1985 and 1989) and Deardorff (1998 , where the trade cost factor ijk t is assumed to be equal to one for the domestically produced good and greater than one for foreign produced goods.
Constrained maximization of (1) leads to optimal consumption levels
where I jk p is an index of trade cost inclusive prices
Multiplying (2) by the trade cost inclusive price ik ijk p t yields the value of exports from country i
We assume that the trade cost factor ijk t is a function of country j's ad-valorem tariff as applied to imports from j in sector k, ijk tar , the geographic distance (as a proxy inter alia for transport costs) between countries i and j, ij D , the costs of communication between the two trading partners, ij C , and the usual set of variables capturing other ties between the exporting and importing countries (adjacency and common language), ij E . We choose the following CobbDouglas functional form for the trade cost function:
Since the import tariff variable is a direct measure of trade costs, the definition of the trade cost factor implies a proportional relationship between ijk t and ) 1 ( ijk tar + . With this assumption,
can be transformed to:
The variables on the right hand side are a mix of exogenous and endogenous variables. To fully estimate the model, one would need to specify supply conditions. This would complicate the analysis significantly, as exogenous determinants of trade (technology, factor endowments) interact with endogenous location effects (firms locate production close to final demand, in order to minimize on trade costs). However, in this study we are primarily interested in estimating the effect of communication costs on trade costs and trade substitution. We can therefore proceed by employing importer and exporter specific dummy variables that account for the country specific exogenous and endogenous variables, and rely entirely on the bilateral variation in the trade cost variables to estimate their impact on trade (Hummels, 1999) . 5 The advantage of this approach is that our empirical model embeds alternative supply determinants of trade. The resulting gravity type equation for bilateral trade between i and j in sector k can be expressed as:
where
A is a set of exporter fixed effects, k j B is set of importer fixed effects,
Obviously, the better substitutes countries' goods are for one another, i.e. the higher the value of k σ , the greater is the extent to which bilateral trade between the two countries is impeded by incorporating communication costs. However, we were not able to obtain non-linear least squares estimates for our estimation sample. A neat feature of our estimation equation (7) is that the inclusion of exporter and importer fixed effects can correct for the omission of variables that are country specific (e.g., non-tariff barriers, differences in inland transportation costs, availability of export finance). In fact, it could be argued that equation (7), while derived from a specific model, has general application:
any model explaining bilateral trade could be expected to result in an exporter specific effect, an importer specific effect, and factors determining trade costs between two trading partners. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that we only measure the effect of trade costs on trade substitution. We do not capture the possibility that a country with overall high costs of communication or transport may in total trade less compared to a country where the overall level of these costs is lower.
III. Data sources
We collected cross-sectional data on the dependent and exogenous variables for the year 1999.
Bilateral trade flows and import tariffs are from the World Bank's World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) database. We work with import data, which are reported on a cost-insurancefreight (cif) basis and therefore include international freight and insurance charges. Information on applied bilateral import tariffs accounts for preferential trading arrangements. 7 We constructed our tariff variable as the weighted average bilateral imported tariff over all 4-digit SITC product groups belonging to the more aggregate product group used in the estimation.
Variation in the importer's tariff across export sources can therefore be due to either trade preferences or a non-uniform tariff structure combined with a varying composition of bilateral trade. The latter can be interpreted as a reflection of the 'Armington assumption' employed in our structural model (i.e., that imports from different sources are imperfect substitutes for one another).
The distance measure refers to the straight-line distance between nations' capitals and was taken from the City Distance Calculator provided by VulcanSoft. 8 As variables capturing other ties between exporters and importers, we used the standard set of dummy variables for sharing a common border and a common language (English, Spanish, French, Portuguese, and Arabic).
We assembled two proxies to capture the communication-related effect of trade costs, each with certain pros and cons. Our first proxy is the per-minute bilateral calling prices charged in the importing and exporting countries, as reported in the ITU's Direction of Traffic Statistics.
Current exchange rates from the IMF International Financial Statistics were used to convert the prices into U.S. dollar values. For each country only the calling prices of the 20 most popular destinations were listed in the ITU database, which limits the number of observations available for estimation. Because the simultaneous availability of bilateral price data for the importing and exporting countries is limited, we tested these two proxies in separate regressions.
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Our second proxy is the product of each country's calling price to the United States. Since the United States is always among the top 20 destinations, use of this proxy allowed us to substantially increase the size of the sample. However, the proxy has two drawbacks. First, calling prices to the United States may not be representative of a country's overall tariff structure. Secondly, in contrast to the two bilateral calling price variables, the variation in one country's calling prices across trading partners is not directly measured, but constructed by multiplying two country-specific variables. The latter approach introduces a bias if the telecom proxy employed is correlated with other country-specific variables that influence bilateral trade and if those variables enter the regression equation in a multiplicative functional form. 8 The software can be freely downloaded at www.vulcansoft.com. 9 The sample that includes calling prices for both exporting and importing country has less than 500 observations. Tentative OLS regressions using this small sample led to similar findings as the ones presented in this study. Tables 2 presents partial correlations among the dependent and independent variables (in natural logs). Tariffs, distance and communication costs are all negatively correlated with bilateral trade. The distance term itself is weakly correlated with the "constructed" telecom proxy (product of U.S. calling prices), but shows a stronger correlation with the bilateral calling prices.
The correlation between the two bilateral calling prices is weak and not statistically significant.
This finding is surprising, as operators at both ends of a bilateral route face the same accounting rate. 10 It suggests that differences in factor costs, market structures, elasticities of demand and pricing regulations play an important role in determining international tariffs. For the purpose of this study, the weak correlation between the two bilateral calling prices is actually adva ntageous, as we can separately assess the role of communication costs incurred by the exporting and importing country.
IV. Structural estimation results

Aggregate trade flows
We start by estimating a single-sector version of equation (7), using aggregate bilateral trade in 1999 as the dependent variable and ordinary least squares estimation technique (Table 3 ). The coefficient on the tariff variable is negative and statistically significant. The implied substitution elasticity ranges from -3.3 to -3.8. The coefficients on distance and each of the three telecom proxies are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The border and language 10 The accounting rate is the wholesale price negotiated between national telecommunications operators for terminating international calls. It is symmetric in the sense that a carrier from country A faces the same accounting rate for settling traffic in country B as the carrie r from country B for settling traffic in country A. See, for example, Yun et al (1997) and Galbi (1998) for further explanation.
dummy variables either show a significant positive coefficient or are not statistically different from zero (except on coefficient on Arabic language which shows a significant negative coefficient). The explanatory power of the model is quite high, with R-squares ranging from 0.809 to 0.927.
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These estimations were subject to several robustness tests, which are described in the Annex.
We tested a model specification that is closer to the functional constraints imposed by the CES preferences. We also addressed potential biases stemming from non-random selection of samples. These additional estimations did not lead to fundamentally different results, but the coefficients on the "pure bilateral" telecommunications price variables were more stable than the "constructed bilateral" telecommunications proxy. In view of these findings and their superior econometric properties, we conclude that the two "pure bilateral" price variables are better measures of the effect of communication costs on bilateral trade.
Disaggregated trade flows
Our second set of estimates are sectoral gravity equations using trade flows disaggregated according to the 2-digit SITC classification. 12 We only present estimation results with regard to the two bilateral calling price variables, distance and the tariff variable (in Table 4 for the bilateral calling price of the exporting country and in Table 5 for the bilateral calling price of the importing country). 13 The sectors are sorted by descending value of the ratio of the coefficient on the bilateral calling price to the coefficient on the tariff variable-the imputed trade cost elasticity with respect to communications costs. Virtually all estimated coefficients on distance and calling prices have the expected negative sign and the great majority of the coefficients are statistically significant. The coefficients on the tariff variable are also mostly negative and statistically significant.
14 The sorting of sectors by the imputed trade cost elasticity suggests that communication costs are relatively more important in sectors that exhibit a greater extent of product differentiation or low international transport costs. Examples of these sectors include chemical materials, pharmaceutical products, specialized machinery. Could it be that communication needs in the case of differentiated products are greater and that trade in these products is therefore more sensitive to variations in the costs of communication?
To explore this question more formally, we employed the product classification developed by Rauch (1999) , who divides internationally traded commodities into three groups. The first group includes all goods that are traded on organized exchanges and consist of homogenous commodities such as cement, steel or tobacco. The second group includes goods that are not traded on organized exchanges but nevertheless possess reference prices. This category of goods still largely consists of homogenous products, such as certain chemicals for which prices are listed in specialized trade publications. The third product group includes all other commodities and thus encompasses all differentiated goods for which significant buyer-seller interaction is necessary.
We estimated sectoral gravity equations using trade flows classified according to Rauch's three product groups, again confining our estimates to the two bilateral calling price proxies (Table 6 ).
The results reveal several interesting patterns. First, the estimated coefficient on the tariff variable is not statistically different from zero in the case of differentiated products, suggesting a low elasticity of substitution (close to unity). However, it is negative and statistically significant in the case of reference priced products (only when using the importer's calling price) and negative, statistically significant and greater in absolute size in the case of products traded over organized exchanges. Our result is consistent with the expectation that the elasticity of 14 The average value of the tariff variable for the exporter calling price sample is, in fact, substantially larger than the corresponding value in the comparable one-sector gravity estimation presented in Table 3 . This result is consistent with findings in the literature that substitution elasticities are larger at the sectoral level than at the aggregate level (Hummels, 1999 and Gallaway et al, 2000) . However, this 'disaggregation effect' is not found in the importer calling price sample.
substitution is larger for more homogenous products, leading to a greater sensitivity of bilateral trade to changes in trade costs.
Second, the estimated distance coefficients for differentiated products are smaller in absolute value than the coefficients for reference priced products, and the coefficients on the latter are again smaller than the ones for products traded over organized exchanges. In other words, in line with our structural model, the rising substitution elasticity leads to a greater sensitivity of bilateral trade to distance. This result is in contrast to Rauch (1999) who finds the coefficient on distance to be larger in absolute value for differentiated products. He argues that the tradeinhibiting effect of distance is likely to be larger in the case of differentiated products, for which greater buyer-seller interaction is necessary.
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Third, the estimated coefficient on the exporter's calling price is not statistically different from zero for products traded over organized exchanges, suggesting that communication cost conditions in the exporting country are of little importance for pure homogenous commodities.
Fourth, the impact of the importer's calling price on trade in differentiated products is substantially larger than on trade in reference priced products and trade in homogenous products.
In fact, we observe an overall 'downward trend' in the coefficient on the telecom proxies as we move from differentiated to homogenous products. Since our estimated substitution elasticity shows a reverse 'upward trend,' the implied elasticity of trade costs with respect to the communication cost proxy is substantially larger for differentiated products than for homogenous products. These results confirm our initial observations based on the sectoral estimations described above. In the Annex, we corrected for a possible bias in our estimates for Rauch's product groups due to a non-random selection of samples, but the results did not change. The other more speculative explanation is that communication costs affect the fixed costs of trading, and that the relative impact on exporters and importers differs across the type of products. Note that if the impact were on the variable costs alone, then who actually pays the cost would be irrelevant because the incidence of those costs would be independently given by the elasticities of demand and supply. With fixed costs of trade, it does matter who actually pays-even though some costs may be passed through prices. Our findings suggest, for example, that suppliers play a virtually passive communication role where homogeneous goods are concerned, and that importers bear a larger burden of communication in the case of differentiated products.
Alternative specifications
Our results accord with intuition, but we must ensure that the revealed importance of telecommunications is not attributable to any specification errors in our structural model. Such errors could be due to omitted variables and endogeneity. In this sub-section, we address each of these problems to the extent feasible.
First of all, we could have excluded determinants of trade costs that are correlated with communications costs. Perhaps the most important such omission is the cost of transportation, which is only imperfectly captured by bilateral distance. Unfortunately, no comprehensive data source exists for bilateral freight charges. Based on nationa l customs data, Hummels (1999) has assembled a dataset that includes commodity-specific ad-valorem transport cost figures for six importing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, United States, and Uruguay). In spite of the small size of the sample, we tested our model for this set of importing countries for the year 1994.
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We introduce the ad-valorem freight variable into the gravity equation (7) this procedure is that we implicitly assume that all the independent variables affect each of the 2-digit SITC product groups in an identical way.
19 Table 7 presents our estimation results. The tariff plus transport cost variable performs according to expectations: it has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The implied elasticity of substitution ranges between -5.3 and -6, which in line with the previous literature (see Hummels, 1999) , but larger than in the 'world gravity' model. The 17 We thank David Hummels for sharing the transport cost data. The dataset actually includes Paraguay as a seventh importing country, but we had to exclude Paraguay due to the unavailability of data on our telecom proxies. We complemented the ITU information with more comprehensive data on the 1994 international calling tariffs for the United States, Brazil and Uruguay. These data were provided to us by national regulators and telecom operators. We did not test the 'constructed telecom proxy' of calling prices to the United States, as this variable cannot, by definition, be constructed for the United States and would have caused a substantial reduction in the number of observations.
18 The regression at the aggregate level could only be run with less than 300 observations and did not produce statis tically significant coefficients on the communication cost proxies.
19 Inclusion of product group specific fixed effect could, in principle, account for sectoral heterogeneities, but this approach would take us away from our structural estimation equation (7).
coefficients on the two telecom variables take the expected negative value, are statistically significant at the 1 percent level (exporter's calling price) and 5 percent level (importer's calling price) and are comparable in magnitude to our earlier results.
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The estimated coefficient on distance takes a similar negative value as in Table 3 It is customary to address endogeneity problems by using the instrumental variable approach in a two stages least squares estimation. In our case, it is not obvious what the appropriate instruments would be, especially since we wish to capture bilateral variations in our telecom variables, and the specific nature of the endogeneity problem is not clear. Nevertheless, we constructed three different instruments: the product of the two trading partners' bilateral accounting rate with the United States; a dummy variable that is one if there was competition for 20 We also performed Rauch product group estimates, using the transport-cost inclusive dataset. Again, to generate more variation in the data, we performed these regressions at the 4-digit SITC level, which is the level on which the Rauch classification is based. While the importer's calling price is only statistically significant in the case of differentiated goods, the pattern of coefficients emerging for the exporter's calling price suggests that communications costs are most important for reference-priced goods, followed by homogeneous and differentiated products. One important caveat with regard to these results is that they are based on markedly different sample sizes, and so there are doubts about their comparability. 21 The border and language dummies also perform according to prior expectations, although the dummies for Spanish and Portuguese language are not statistically different from zero. R-squares are relatively low, ranging between 0.337 and 0.386. This is due to the fact that estimations are performed on disaggregate trade flows which show greater noise than aggregate trade flows or trade flows belonging to the same product group.
international services on both ends of the bilateral route; and the product of a country specific proxy capturing the extent to which incumbent public telecommunications operators were privatized. 22 The three variables performed according to expectations in the first stage estimation (positive sign for the accounting rate, negative sign for the competition and privatization proxies), although the privatization variable was not always statistically significant.
The second stage estimation results for the aggregate 'world gravity model' are presented in Table 8 . The coefficient on the instrumented calling prices is significantly negative and much larger than the estimate in the earlier OLS regression (Table 3) , taking a value of -2.806 in the case of the importer's calling price.
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These results underline a concern that is in fact also raised by our earlier estimates: the unexpectedly large impact of telecommunication costs-and trade costs more generally-on trade. Taken at their face value, our estimates suggest, for example, that a halving of the importer's calling price leads to a 42.5 percent increase in aggregate bilateral trade. These are large values even if bilateral communication costs are seen as proxies for the quality and ease of communication between two nations. The large impact of the trade cost proxies is not new to our study or to communications costs per se, however. Take the distance coefficient, which is in line with estimates found in the literature. A doubling of the exporter-importer distance reduces bilateral trade by up to 50 percent, which can hardly be justified in pure transport cost terms.
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The existing literature offers at least two explanations. One is that trade costs affect bilateral trade through channels other than the 'simple' trade substitution mechanism underlying the gravity equation. Hummels (1999) suggests that the trade cost proxies may pick up endogenous supply responses by firms choosing production locations to minimize trade costs. If endogenous 22 Specifically, the latter variable is defined as one plus the equity share in the incumbent operator that was in private hands. The data on competition in international telecommunications and the extent of privatization was obtained from the ITU-World Bank Telecommunications Policy Database. 23 We also performed instrumental variable regressions for the three 'Rauch' product groups. The coefficients on the calling price variables are much larger in absolute value than those obtained from the aggregate regression, although the exporter calling price is not always statistically significant.
24 Hummels (1999) provides some estimates of the elasticity of ad-valorem transport costs with respect to distance, ranging between 0.2 and 0.4 depending on the transport mode. Given that transport, on average, does not make up more than 10 percent of the value of traded goods, this implies an elasticity of the transport cost factor-one plus the ad-valorem transport cost-with respect to distance of 0.02 to 0.04, implying a much smaller price premium. This point was originally noted by Grossman (1998).
supply effects simply lead to a reallocation of resources between individual sectors k, then they are captured in our estimation equation. 25 However, each individual sector k still lumps together fairly heterogeneous sub-groups, and so our trade cost proxies may in fact pick up endogenous location effects operating at a more disaggregate level.
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A second possibility is that our trade cost proxies measure not only trade costs but also differences in cons umer preferences over products from different locations. The utility function in equation (1) assumes that consumers in all importing countries j put equal preference weights, ik β , on products from the same sources i. A more general specification would allow these weights to differ across exporting countries. It is easy show that these bilateral weights, ijk β , are then not absorbed by the country-specific fixed effects. If these bilateral weights are correlated with the proxies we took as measuring trade costs alone, then it is possible that the estimated coefficients in the gravity equation capture the effect of both bilateral trade costs and bilateral preferences (see Balistrery and Hillberry, 2001 ). However, while it is plausible that distance and language proxies are related to bilateral preferences, such a relationship is less obvious in the case of telecommunication costs.
V. Conclusion
The link between communication costs and the pattern of trade has been based previously more Notes: OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors. tstatistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 'Correct' indicates a dummy variable as the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level; 'insignificant' indicates a dummy variable is not statistically different from zero; and 'wrong' indicates a dummy variables has a wrong negative sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. Notes: OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. Notes: OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. The classification of product groups is based on Rauch (1999). 'Correct' indicates a dummy variable as the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level; 'insignificant' indicates a dummy variable is not statistically different from zero; and 'wrong' indicates a dummy variables has a wrong negative sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. Notes: OLS regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 'Correct' indicates a dummy variable as the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level; 'insignificant' indicates a dummy variable is not statistically different from zero; and 'wrong' indicates a dummy variables has a wrong negative sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. Notes: Second stage instrumental variable regression with exporter and importer fixed effects and White robust standard errors. t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 'Correct' indicates a dummy variable as the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level; 'insignificant' indicates a dummy variable is not statistically different from zero; and 'wrong' indicates a dummy variables has a wrong negative sign and is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. Bilateral calling price variables are fitted values from a first stage regression, using as instruments the products of accounting rates and proxies for privatization and competition in the provision of international telephone services (as explained in text).
Annex: Robustness tests
In this annex, we present additional econometric estimates to assess how robust our findings are to earlier years of estimation, additional regressors, and alternative model specifications.
First, in a one-sector setup, our model can be extended to yield the well-known gravity equation
with unit-elastic income terms. The purpose of this exercise is to test the robustness of our estimation equation (7) vis-à-vis an alternative specification that is closer to the functional constraints imposed by the CES preferences in equation (1).
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Dropping the super/subscript k and normalizing each country's product price, i p , at unity, we can transform equation (4) to:
where w Y denotes world GDP. 28 Similar to the multi-sector models, we can account for country specific variables by employing exporter and importer specific dummy variables. But we can preserve the unit-elastic income terms by specifying our estimation equation in terms of the share of bilateral trade in the product of the two trading partners' GDPs:
27 Note that structural derivations of the gravity equations do not always predict a unit-elastic effect of the two income terms. See, for example, Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985 and 1989) . 28 See Deardorff (1998) . In equation (A1), bilateral trade depends on incomes and a complex term which captures the trade inhibiting effect of bilateral trade costs. Specifically, the term in the square bracket says that if importing country j's relative trade cost with country i is greater than an average of all demander's relative trade costs with i, then exports from i to j will be correspondingly smaller. The trade inhibiting effect depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution σ . If 1 = σ (the Cobb-Douglas case), the term in the square bracket is equal to one and exports will simply be reduced proportional to the trade cost factor to a level below the "frictionless" benchmark. Table A1 shows the results of estimating equation (A2). 29 The overall fit of the regression is poorer than in Table 3 , with R-squares ranging from 0.45 to 0.73. Nonetheless, it is remarkable that the estimated coefficients on the tariff variable, distance and the two "pure bilateral" calling prices remain largely unchanged. By contrast, the coefficients on the "constructed bilateral" telecom proxy is smaller in value. The latter finding may be explained by the variable picking up the effect of the excluded GDP terms in the regression with unconstrained income elasticities.
Second, our estimations may suffer from a biased selection of samples, especially the regressions with the bilateral calling price variables which only encompass between 1,000 and 1,200
observations. We distinguish between two types of sample selection biases: zero trade flows (which are, by definition, excluded in a log-linear model specification) and the availability of data on our telecom proxy. We employ a Heckman sample selection model to correct for a possible estimation bias in the basic OLS regression. Specifically, we estimate two first-stage probit equations-one for the existence of positive trade flows and one for the availability of telecom data-and include two selectivity correction variables in the main regression. 30 Our explanatory variables in the probit equations are GDP, population and dummies for being a landlocked or island economy of both the exporting and importing country as well as geographic distance and dummy variables for sharing a common language. Table A2 presents the second stage estimation results of the sample selection model. 31 The estimated coefficients are similar to the ones obtained in the simple OLS regression (Table 3) . A notable exception is the coefficient on the product of calling prices to the US, which is much smaller in size, but still significant at the 1 percent level. None of the selectivity correction parameters are statistically significant, except the parameter for non-zero trade flows in the regression using the product of calling prices to the United States. This result suggests a sample selection bias in the larger sample estimates that use the product of US calling prices as the telecom proxy. Correcting for this bias reduces the size of the coefficient on this proxy to a level comparable to the other two calling price proxies.
29 Countries' GDPs were taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. 30 In doing so, we assume that the error terms in the two probit regressions are uncorrelated. 31 The first stage probit regressions overwhelmingly show the expected signs and are mostly statistically significant.
We also estimated a sample selection model for the sectoral gravity models using the Rauch classification of products. The second stage estimation results are presented in Table A3 . The coefficients on the tariff variable are similar to the simple OLS regressions (Table 6 ). In the case of differentiated goods the point estimate is now close to zero for both samples, suggesting a substitution elasticity of close to unity. The coefficients on distance are somewhat lower compared to the simple OLS regression (Table 6 ), whereas the telecom coefficients remain largely unchanged. The conclusions regarding the relative importance of communications costs across the three Rauch product groups remain unchanged. In particular, we observe a 'downward trend' in the coefficient on the importer's calling price as we move from differentiated to homogenous products, whereas the estimated substitution elasticity shows a 'reverse' upward trend. Moreover, the exporter's calling price does not have a statistically significant impact for products traded over organized exchanges. Only three out of twelve sample correction parameters are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and two more parameters are significant at the 10 percent leve l. Overall, these findings suggest that potential biases from a non-random selection of samples are likely to be small.
Finally, we tested how robust our findings concerning trade in differentiated versus homogenous products are to the product classification used. Rauch (1999) provides an alternative "more liberal" classification, which maximizes the number of commodities that are classified as either organized exchange or reference priced. The OLS estimation results using the "more liberal"
classification (not presented here) were very similar to the ones presented in Table 6 and confirmed all the findings discussed in the text. 
